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The Intrinsic Structure of Reality: Ontology and Deep Ecology 
Charles List 
One of the central tenets in the works of Paul Shepard is that there is a way the world is, 
independent of human constructions, a way we must first discover and then recognize and 
embrace if we are to escape the destructive path he argues we are on. His continuing worries 
about undecidable ideological and political conflicts detailed in “Radical Politics” are motivated 
by what he perceives as the unwillingness in academic and environmentalist circles to accept 
this fundamental realism. There are two kinds of philosophical realism: that which opposes 
nominalism by asserting the reality of universals and that which opposes idealism by asserting 
the reality of material objects. Shepard, I believe, endorses what has been called a “scientific 
realism” which asserts, as Brian Ellis puts it, that “science really is in the business of stripping 
reality of appearances in order to discover the hidden causes of things, and that science has, in 
fact, successfully revealed a great deal about the underlying structure of reality.”1 
In “Radical Politics” Shepard posits realism concerning the hidden causes of things as a 
necessary antidote to the untenable state of affairs in which environmental issues and 
problems, such as the “impact of the human population, the existence of other species, the 
menacing of soil, water, and forests, the use of watersheds, the energy and nutrient systems, 
the air itself” become the subjects for lobbying and political wrangling with no objective way to 
resolve them. He continues:  
Each of these becomes an issue in which coalitions of social groups rise and fall, 
working out their compromises on the shared assumption that the world has 
no intrinsic structure, few givens, but rather an order projected upon it by 
humans that creates coherence.2 
But if the world does have an intrinsic structure, what is it? Why is it intrinsic and what are the 
fundamental categories comprising this structure? In what follows, I shall offer an ontological 
sketch that fills out and makes coherent the “intrinsic structure” of reality demanded by 
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Shepard in “Radical Politics.” Once this sketch is in place, it will allow us to understand, on the 
one hand, why Shepard calls for “compliance with the truly radical Other:  the constraints and 
obligations of the biological reality of ecosystem and planetary communities composed of 
Beings.”3 These constraints are imposed by the world on human thought and not by humans on 
the world. On the other hand, I hope to show that this ontology is not as “deep” as some deep 
ecologists make it out to be.4 That is, I will argue that the ontology I sketch has the virtues of 
being consistent both with Shepard’s thoughts and with a fairly standard view in the philosophy 
of biology.   
 
ONTOLOGY  
The intrinsic structure of reality as envisioned by Shepard has, I believe, two foundational 
supports. An early indication of the first of these is found in the 1959 paper “A Theory of the 
Value of Hunting.” 
The condemnation of killing wild animals for sport extends from some very 
provincial and anthropocentric premises. It is only a biased opinion that death 
is the worst of natural events. It is part of the naive assumption that order in 
nature is epitomized by living objects rather than complex flow patterns of 
which objects are temporary formations.5  
He elaborates these flow patterns as the “complicated cycles of elements, in the sweep of 
evolution, and in the patterns of the flow of energy.”6 So the order in nature also includes, 
besides the organisms, the flow patterns between these organisms. This heightened awareness 
of energy cycles in addition to organisms remains constant throughout Shepard’s works. More 
than 30 years later in his 1992 paper “A Post-Historic Primitivism” he writes: “The great 
metaphysical discovery by the cynegetic world was cyclicity. It emerged in the context of the 
rites of death, both human and animal, as part of this flow.”7 The cynegetic world of hunters 
and gatherers, Shepard believes, had things metaphysically right, and much of his work is 
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dedicated to detailing this world and its implications for us. If the world, and in particular its 
ecosystems have an intrinsic structure, as Shepard clearly believes, we need also to find out 
what the units of this structure are as well as understanding their relations to the patterns of 
energy flow. Into and out of what is this energy flowing? The second ontological foundation for 
Shepard’s intrinsic structure of ecosystems are not merely those provincial and typical “living 
objects” or individual organisms but rather the species into which they are grouped. These 
species, I think, must be the members of those “planetary communities composed of Beings” 
mentioned above.  The ontological status of biological species is a matter of extensive 
contemporary debate.8 Given this debate, one of Shepard’s comments relevant to the status of 
species points us in two incompatible directions. He says, “Our hunting past tells us that the 
species is the ‘individual,’ each animal the occasion of the species’ ‘soul.’”9 And while current 
and past philosophical debates concerning the ontological status of biological species may not 
have motivated Shepard’s poetic historical comment, it does nicely frame a crucial ontological 
choice. There are important differences between understanding species as individuals or 
alternatively as having souls and which path one takes has implications regarding the 
metaphysics one attributes to Shepard. 
One way to interpret Shepard’s comment that species have a “soul” is that they have an 
“essence” or that they are, in contemporary parlance, natural kinds. Objects belong to natural 
kinds in virtue of their all having an identical property that determines their membership in that 
kind and which explains other properties of the species. This belief, dating back to at least 
Aristotle, has been roundly rejected by many contemporary scientists and philosophers of 
biology. Aristotle, for example, says humans are essentially rational animals, where rational is 
the individuating essence and animal is the genus. Some contemporary essentialist 
philosophers of science argue that chemical elements such as copper are natural kinds like this: 
anything without that essential atomic number cannot be copper, and it is this essence that 
explains its powers and propensities.10 On this essentialist view, applied to organic species, bald 
eagles would form a natural kind the members of which all have an essential property in 
common, on analogy with the atomic number of copper. This essentialist view of organic 
species, however, faces several daunting questions: first, since species evolve, there is a 
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continuous lineage linking bald eagles and golden eagles to a common ancestor. And this 
ancestor species itself is in a continuous line to even earlier species. So, at what point did eagles 
acquire their essence? Any answer to this question seems arbitrary, based upon our 
determinations and not those present essentially in nature. Second, the members of a species 
are never identical at any given time; they vary in many ways, including genetically. So in virtue 
of what identical property do they have the same essence? Again, the line we draw around 
species seems to be determined by us, something Shepard clearly rejects in “Radical Politics.”11 
So here we face a choice for understanding the intrinsic structure Shepard demands to resolve 
political mythmaking. Should we stick with the problematic species essentialism, or take the 
other path hinted at by his saying species are individuals? I shall recommend the latter course. 
To view species as individuals is to conceive them as analogous to individual organisms. 
Individuals on this view have parts that must be structured in certain ways for the organism to 
continue to exist. For instance, an organism’s respiration and reproductive abilities require that 
those parts function as part of the whole or the organism would fail to breathe or reproduce. 
Whereas individuals and species are restricted by spatial and temporal limits, members of 
essential natural kinds are not so restricted. Copper is an essential natural kind because no 
matter where or when bits of copper are found in the universe, they have the same atomic 
number and therefore the same capacities and powers. But organic species as individuals are 
restricted. An eagle is an individual because its parts are casually connected allowing for flight, 
the capture of fish, reproduction, and so on. Analogously, species are individuals in that they 
have parts that are organisms, spatio-temporally clustered together by virtue of their being 
causally connected to other members of the species determined by their evolution. So for 
example, bald eagles are an individual species because the organisms are connected by their 
evolutionary lineage and, importantly, by their connections with other species in their 
ecosystem Eagles have the lineage they have because of their evolutionary history. So, on this 
view, species are still real things, the basic units of evolution, but they do not have essences. 
So, if we can take “species are individuals” as one foundation of Shepard’s ontology, we are 
then able to turn to the other foundational support for the intrinsic structure of the biological 
world: the “complicated cycles and flow patterns of energy” so prominent in his thought. How 
one understands these flow patterns depends crucially on one’s conception of species. The 
issue here is what to make of Shepard’s clearly stated belief in the priority of these flow 
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patterns.  We again face at least two possible choices. First, the flows of energy could be of 
prior explanatory  importance, that is, they will be used to understand the structure of 
ecosystems and the species that are their components.  Second, and more radically, the energy 
flow patterns could be taken as ontologically prior in that they are more real than the 
organisms that are the temporary loci of the energy.  
 
HOW DEEP? 
This issue of the priority of energy flows is closely tied to Shepard’s frequent inclusion in the 
deep ecology movement.12 While undoubtedly Shepard’s politics and policy proposals are so 
aligned, it is not so clear that his ontology is. J. Baird Callicott places Shepard with Arne Naess as 
a deep ecologist in virtue of their presumed agreement on a fundamental metaphysical belief 
that “organisms are knots in the biospherical net of intrinsic relations,” as Naess says.13 Knots 
obviously can’t exist without the ropes out of which they are tied. Given this picture, organisms 
are dependent for their existence on the net of intrinsic relations. And if these intrinsic relations 
are flows of energy, organisms are dependent upon energy for their existence. But put this way 
this seems just common sense: of course an organism would die if it didn’t get energy in some 
form. Callicott, however, draws from this the implication that for deep ecologists, “energy 
seems to be a more fundamental and primitive reality than…organisms.”14 He then 
characterizes Shepard’s view as follows: 
“Shepard, thus ... suggested that an object ontology is inappropriate to an 
ecological description of the natural environment. Living natural objects should 
be regarded as ontologically subordinate to ‘events’ and/or ‘flow patterns’ 
and/or ‘field patterns.’”15  
So Callicott argues Shepard’s metaphysics is included in deep ecology based on the ontological 
priority of energy flows. And this object ontology certainly would be rejected by Shepard if 
species were conceived as individuals every bit as real as their members. But, does it really 
follow from the rejection of a reductionist ontology of objects that organisms are less real than 
energy flows? Consider an alternative account of energy priority. Suppose species are 
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individuals. They are every bit as real as their members. Further, membership by organisms in 
species is accounted for by their evolutionary paths. David Wilson, for example, observes that 
some very different kinds of species, e.g. certain kinds of snails, seeds, and beetles, all have 
evolved ever-harder shells.  Since the shells of these organisms are all made of different 
materials, the best explanation of this fact seems to be that in each case predation is driving the 
process.16 This “top down” explanation certainly puts methodological emphasis on one kind of 
energy flow, namely, the kind in which energy is transferred from prey to predator, from eaten 
to eater. But in this case there is no temptation to say that the energy is more real than the 
organisms, only that energy flows are crucial in understanding the way species change. Perhaps 
Shepard is simply expressing a preference for such top down explanations. So, it does not 
necessarily follow from the methodological priority of energy that organisms are ontologically 
less real than either their species or the relations between species.   
Given the alternative ontology sketched above, Shepard can agree that relations and processes 
regarding energy are of great methodological and explanatory importance in understanding 
ecosystems without agreeing with Callicott and Naess that organisms are “ontologically 
subordinate” to these. That is, organisms are not as important methodologically as the energy 
relations between species in explaining and describing ecosystems—they are “knots” if you like, 
they do not “epitomize nature”—but they are the parts of species, every bit as real as the 
species itself. The parts of an organism such as its heart are no less real than the organism, so 
the parts of a species-individual are no less real than the species.17 
To return to “Radical Politics,” Shepard is concerned with an ideological “myth” that denies that 
the world has an intrinsic structure. He says this: 
The ideological myth presupposes a definition of being, which is at odds with 
modern ecological and ethnological understanding, hence those sciences are 
seen as subversive and often in tandem with feminist concerns, sharing an 
organismic and intuitive core.18 
The “definition of being” proposed by this myth is of human-created coherence in nature. 
However, there is another kind of myth making, which also is at odds with modern ecological 
understanding. This myth would have us believe the intrinsic structure of the world is a 
structure of essences, where energy flows are more real than organisms. A monistic myth—
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where energy is the only thing that is real—motivates Callicott to include Shepard in the 
metaphysics of the deep ecologists. A similar interpretive stance is taken by Frederic Bender 
when he invokes a Spinozian “immanent Divine Process” to account for the essential structure 
of the web of life.19 And Michael Cohen discussing ecology as a subversive science says that 
“...some have proposed a theory and practice of 'ecocriticism,' which seems to be attempting to 
say that ...there is some essential or primary order of nature called 'ecology' which we can 
know...”20 The ontological alternative I have sketched is not so at odds with the practice of 
contemporary ecology. 
Given the non-essentialist view of species and the methodological rather than ontological 
priority of energy, the core belief Shepard defends in “Radical Politics” is retained:  the world 
has an intrinsic structure underlying various competing ideologies. This world consists of 
species and their evolved relations, these being methodologically primary in scientific 
explanation. However, the burden of monistic essentialism is removed and to that extent 
Shepard’s ontology is lifted from the deep.  
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